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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Is low inﬂation here to stay? Competing theories may provide hints about
the likely permanence — or not — of the contemporary low-inﬂation regime.
Some would probably insist on the evolution of monetary institutions, more
independent and more focused on price stability during the recent period of
G r e a tM o d e r a t i o nt h a ni nt h el a s te p i s o d eo fG r e a tI n ﬂation (see, e.g., Crowe
and Meade, 2007). Others have pointed to globalization as a weight on
inﬂationary pressures (see, e.g., Gamber and Hung, 2001, and Rogoﬀ, 2003).
However, such theories, as well as the mechanisms and policies implied,
address the ‘how did we arrive there?’ question rather than the one that
naturally follows, i.e., ‘where do we go from here?’.
More deeply rooted explanations of the worldwide trend toward low in-
ﬂation are therefore needed to answer the second question. In such a con-
text, inﬂation preferences are fundamental, as their dynamics is shaping
an a t i o n ’ si n ﬂation prospects. Hence, investigating the long-run evolution
of inﬂation aversion is crucial to determine if low inﬂation is here to stay
or if central banks have to be wary of inﬂation, whatever their degree of
independence. One thus has to focus on social preferences with regard to
the desirable inﬂation and explore their transmission from one generation
to another. Along such lines, part of an explanation would lie in the ‘inﬂa-
tion culture’ societies have built through history (see, e.g., Hayo, 1998, and
Vaubel, 2003). Whereas most of the literature in economics assumes pref-
erences as ‘priors’ which are endowed to agents and do not change, a more
promising route to understand the key determinants and the sustainability
of the recent low-inﬂation regime is to look at preferences as shaped out
by evolutionary and cultural forces in society. Dual inheritance theory in
anthropology and other social sciences, treated at length in Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985), suggests that genes (or
‘nature’) are not the only factor responsible in inﬂuencing traits and prac-
tices of individuals. While it takes a large number of generations for such
evolutionary inheritance to mutate, beliefs, values and behavior inherited
as culture (in a general sense, imitative or social learning typical mostly for
humans, and often dubbed ‘nurture’) can be modiﬁed much faster, in a gen-
eration or two, as individuals and societies adapt in response to observation
and experience.
In particular, when it comes to intergenerational transmission of socially-
relevant attitudes such as inﬂation aversion, as in the present paper, the
entire eﬀect on the dynamics of preferences would rather belong to culture,
and not to genes. There is anthropological evidence that culture inﬂuences
risk aversion (Henrich and McElreath, 2002) and judgement (Nisbett, 2003).
And from an economist’s point of view, it has been argued by Hayo (1998)
that preferences for low inﬂation may have their roots in a nation’s culture.
Of course, culture and preferences are ultimately moulded by history, as2 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
relevant past experience — e.g., hyperinﬂationary episodes in the context here
— is then transferred as collective memory to the next generations (Vaubel,
2003).1 Thus, it is not surprising that, as Scheve (2004) shows, there is
signiﬁcant cross-country variation in inﬂation aversion, while Jayadev (2006)
reveals that such preferences may also originate in an individual’s relative
position in society.
Based on such a departing hypothesis, we endogenize inﬂation aversion
preferences as being culturally transmitted from one generation to another,
in a process of socialization where parents and peers aﬀect the adoption of
a given trait (degree of inﬂation aversion, in our case) depending on chance,
eﬀort and learning from the relevant history (materialized inﬂation). In
implementing this approach, we follow Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) who
build on the literature within economics on endogenous preferences2 to de-
velop and analyze formal set-ups where preferences evolve across genera-
tions. Though these authors are interested in the provision of public goods,
their framework has more recently been used by Bisin et al. (2004) and Sáez-
Martí and Sjögren (2008) to study the transmission of cultural traits. We
here extend this framework to investigate how the intergenerational dynam-
ics of inﬂation aversion is inﬂuenced by endogenous preference transmission
in response to learning from inﬂation experience3 and the resulting collective
memory; and, in eﬀect, to throw more light on the question whether ‘low
inﬂation is here to stay’.
It may seem surprising that very few papers have examined the long-
run stability of inﬂation aversion. However, in addition to the constraining
assumption of exogenous preferences in theoretical models, this outcome
probably also reﬂects a simple empirical trend: economists now generally
admit that central bank independence — embodied in laws and regulations
in many countries over the last two decades — reveals a society’s inﬂation
aversion. From such a perspective, then, everything appears as if the world
1‘Collective memory’ is a concept introduced by Halbwachs (1925), but mostly de-
veloped in social science since the 1970s, together with the related notions of ‘historical
memory’ and ‘common memory’. It has been used across a wide spectrum of contexts,
e.g., to designate monuments and acts to remember past atrocities (e.g., Nelson and Olin,
eds., 2003) or contractual reminder devices for forgetful agents (e.g., Miller and Rozen,
2009). Mithander et al., eds., (2007) associate collective memory with how individuals,
communities and nations have dealt with their past through remembrance, historiography
and legal settlements. We employ it mostly in its latter, narrower sense, as enshrined
in a society’s (here, monetary) institutions evolving out of common experiences, also the
interpretation (there, related to individual cultural investment decisions) used by Dessí
(2008).
2Which can be traced to Becker (1976), Hirshleifer (1977) and Rubin and Paul (1979);
Becker (1996) is a widely cited book; Dekel et al. (2007) provide a useful update, in
particular on the game-theoretic ‘indirect evolutionary approach’ we do not pursue here.
3For an early analysis of social learning and personality development in cognitive psy-
chology, see, e.g., Bandura and Walters (1963); for a compact survey of learning models
in economics, see, e.g., Sobel (2000).Intergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 3
has evolved towards higher inﬂation aversion, evidenced by the rising number
of central banks made independent or, for the ones which were already, by
the increase in their degree of independence (see Guillén and Polillo, 2005,
Crowe and Meade, 2007, or Arnone et al., 2009, for example, who document
this evolution). Yet, though the trend has been towards more independence,
we do not know if a reversal would not occur and, this, all the more so since
legal attempts to restrict central bank independence can be rewarding for
short-sighted politicians (see, e.g., Waller, 1991). Hence, this paper goes
deeper by exploring the long-run drivers of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni no r d e rt o
assess the sustainability of the low-inﬂation regime.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we analyze the dynamics of inﬂation aver-
sion preferences in an overlapping-generations (OLG) model with heteroge-
nous mature agents characterized by diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation aversion.
We begin by showing how the stability of a society’s degree of inﬂation aver-
sion in a deterministic version of our framework depends on the direction
and speed of changes in the structure of the population’s preferences, imply-
ing an ultimate survival of one of the types and complete extinction of the
other (as in evolutionary models explored within economic contexts). We
then discuss how convergence to an interior equilibrium can emerge under
the presence of cultural substitution in the socialization eﬀorts of parents
(as in the methodologically related papers by Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001,
and Sáez-Martí and Sjögren, 2008). However, one of the main contributions
of the paper is to demonstrate that in a further, more realistic extension
of the set-up to a stochastic process for inﬂation implying learning from
observed history and a corresponding inﬂuence on the exerted socialization
eﬀort (for given socialization costs), an irregular long-run cyclical pattern in
the dynamics of social preferences may be generated.
In the second part of the paper, we empirically test the key theoretical
predictions derived from our model. To do so, we ﬁrst construct a novel,
survey-based measure of inﬂation aversion appropriate for our purposes.
Given the lack of time series in an intergenerational context, we then im-
plement a cross-section check of the implications of our theory. Applying
weighted least squares (with alternative weighting vectors) to a sample of
the 33 countries participating in the International Social Survey Program
on the Role of Government (ISSP RoG), the wave of 2006, we ﬁnd evidence
that the proportion of retirees (by its own or relative to the proportion of
the working age population), as a proxy for the more inﬂation-averse type,
is strongly associated with a society’s degree of inﬂation aversion. Moreover,
our regressions also conﬁrm the relevance of the other key factors inﬂuencing
the degree of inﬂation aversion highlighted in our model, such as the expe-
rience with high inﬂation, the degree of central bank independence, and the
respect of the rule of law in its dimension of property rights. Our ﬁndings
thus imply that, with an ageing population structure as a stable trend and
no major exogenous inﬂation shocks over the next generation span or so,4 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
low inﬂation is here to stay.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, focus-
ing on the types of preferences and the dynamics of preference transmis-
sion across generations; in it, we analytically demonstrate, and illustrate
by simulations, how the evolving structure of the population and parents’
socialization eﬀorts respond to experience with inﬂation. Section 3, in turn,
presents our empirical application in support of the theoretical results. The
ﬁnal section concludes, while Appendix A presents the data deﬁnitions and
sources.
2 Theoretical Framework
We here build on the OLG set-up of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), to
extend and apply it to the long-run evolution of inﬂation aversion.
2.1 Preference Types and Monetary Institutions
A generation consists of a continuum of individuals, each living for two pe-
riods and having one oﬀspring, so that the population is constant and the
size of the mature generation is normalized to one. We consider two types,
a and b, of preferences in the population deﬁn e do nap r i v a t eg o o dc and a
public good G, which we interpret narrowly as independence of the central
bank. In the beginning of their mature life, all individuals receive an iden-
tical endowment $. The degree of central bank independence is decided in
each period by majority voting in parliament through proportional repre-
sentation of the mature generation.4 Following Bisin and Verdier (2000),
we assume that each period t each adult chooses the total amount of the
public good, Gt, knowing that everyone else in the society, irrespective of
preference type, will have to contribute an equal share, Gt
1 (where unity in
the denominator comes from the normalization of the mature population),
towards the cost of providing the public good in the same period.5 However,
only agents of type a prefer a strongly independent central bank, whereas
agents of type b have milder preferences with regard to central bank inde-
pendence. In eﬀect, all agents value central bank independence. But the
particular degree of independence depends on the outcome of voting in par-
liament each period, as a direct projection of the proportion of each type
of inﬂation-aversion preferences in the society. In our set-up, therefore, the
4Modeling the political system is out of the scope of this article, and we refer the reader
to Faust (1996), Bullard and Waller (2004) or Berentsen and Strub (2009).
5The literature on the private provision of public goods allows a less restrictive setting
where each agent chooses his contribution, in units of consumption good, and the resulting
amount of the public good equals the sum of all contributions. We leave this avenue for
future research.Intergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 5
beneﬁts of central bank independence are implicit,6 the choice being between
diﬀerent degrees of independence. Preferences, then, can be represented in
the following (separable) form:
ui (ct,G t)=ui (ct)+γiυi (Gt), with i ∈ {a,b} and γa > γb > 0
where u(ct) and υ(Gt) are strictly concave, increasing functions satisfy-
ing u0 (0) = υ0 (0) = ∞.
A particular degree of central bank independence, if voted in period t,
entails at the same time a social cost, i.e., some function Gt (·).T h i si sa n
aggregate cost to society which can come from several sources. It could,
for example, be related to a distortion of the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ that
may arise at very low levels of inﬂation. This argument has been raised by
Akerlof et al. (1996) and Benigno and Ricci (2008), the mechanism behind
it being that the sacriﬁce ratio would increase at low levels of inﬂation. Such
a situation may be perceived as costly by (part of) the electorate.7
Without loss of generality and following the huge literature on the provi-
sion of public goods, the social cost of central bank independence is hereafter
expressed in terms of good c. If the fraction qi
t,w i t h0 ≤ qi
t ≤ 1,o ft y p e
i ∈ {a,b} individuals at time t is more than a half, then qi
t >q
j
t,a n dt h ev o t -
ing equilibrium degree of central bank independence solves the maximization
program of the type i (identical) agents
max
Gt




































= const (given that the endowment $ = const is identical across
6The literature has widely insisted on such beneﬁts (see notably the survey by Berger
et al., 2001, or Crowe and Meade, 2007), so we avoid their discussion here, to focus on
our point.
7One could also think about relating the social cost of central bank independence to
transparency and accountability issues, which induce a (costly) degree of monitoring by
the polity of the central bank’s actions.6 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
time periods as well as mature individuals, which was assumed as a natural
counterpart to the assumed constant population above) and the correspond-
ing preferred degree of central bank independence of type i agents in any
period t. Plugging that constant optimal degree of central bank indepen-
dence back into the utility yields the value function of the type i agent:
V i ($) ≡ argmax
G
ui ($ − G)+γiυi (G)
= ui £





Because of the optimality of Gi∗ (·) and the positivity of γi > 0,
V i ($) >u i ($)
so that it is always in the interest of a type i mature agent to enjoy the
public good, here her particular, preferred degree of central bank indepen-
dence, namely Gi∗ (·).
However, the exact degree of central bank independence is determined by
the dominant type of agents’ preferences via representation in parliament.
From (1) above, we have:
γa =






= γb > 0 (2)
Hence, the optimal degree of independence for each type is shaped by
the agent’s endowment and the way she feels aﬀected by the cost of central
bank independence. In other words, the higher the cost, the lower the op-
timal degree of independence to be accepted by the agent. If an agent feels
that her net consumption possibilities ($ − G) would be reduced under a
higher degree of independence, because such an independence would imply
al o w e rl e v e lo fi n ﬂation and thus, along the lines of the above argument,
a deterioration of the sacriﬁce ratio, her opposition to an increase in the
degree of independence would be stronger. However, the marginal rates of
substitution (MRS) of private good consumption for public good consump-
tion across types implied by (2) diﬀer, with type a’s such MRS being higher
(which is consistent with the higher degree of central bank independence
preferred by this type in the population) than type b’s MRS. Therefore the
overall dynamics of the fraction of each type in the population will inﬂuence
the intergenerational transmission of inﬂation aversion, by socialization and
voting behavior each period, as we show in the next subsection.
To anticipate on the empirical application provided further down, one
can think of the active working-age population as one type (b in our inter-
pretation) who, fearing the consequences of a less favorable inﬂation-output
trade-oﬀ on their probability of ﬁnding a job quickly in a recession, would
support a lower degree of central bank independence than retirees, for whomIntergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 7
such concerns resound less than the protection of their savings from inﬂa-
tion. This reinforces the need to consider the stability of the central bank
independence solution to the inﬂation bias, as the mechanisms supporting
this solution may not be permanently operative in the economy.
2.2 Deterministic Dynamics of Preference Transmission
As in Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) and Sáez-Martí and Sjögren (2008),
we begin by modeling the transmission of inﬂation aversion preferences as
occurring through socialization. We then extend their framework to account
for learning from experience in a dynamic-stochastic economic environment.
Children are born ‘naive’, i.e., with not well-deﬁned preferences, but
acquire them through observation, imitation and adoption of ‘cultural mod-
els’ with which they are matched. This matching, termed ‘socialization’,
naturally comes in two steps and is inﬂuenced to some extent by economic
choices, but also by parents. Children are ﬁrst exposed to their parents
model (type a or b), and are thus ‘matched’ with their family, in what can
be termed ‘vertical transmission’. If they do not adopt their parents’ trait,
they are then exposed to the inﬂuence of other individuals of the old gen-
eration (e.g., teachers, peers, role models) and adopt the preference type of
some among these, i.e., ‘oblique transmission’.8
Moreover, ‘imperfect empathy’ is assumed throughout the paper, a com-
mon assumption in the emerging socialization literature within economics.
It means that parents can perceive the welfare of their children only through
the ﬁlter of their own preferences. Imperfect empathy is thus a particular
form of myopia which implies that parents always want to socialize their
children to their own preferences and cultural traits, in essence because
they think this will have positive consequences for their children’s life (in
material or nonmaterial sense). In our set-up the assumption would imply
that parents consider the beneﬁts of their preferred degree of central bank
independence desirable enough so that they feel a moral duty to bequest it.
Such a conviction may arise from a kind of ‘veil of ignorance’ reasoning by
the adult population, or — rather, in our intergenerational context — from
past experience transmitted to them by their own parents.9
Exogenous Vertical Preference Transmission To examine the mech-
anism driving the intergenerational transmission of inﬂation aversion, the
present subsection initially supposes that the child adopts his parent’s pref-
8Terminology taken from the anthropological and psychological literature, notably
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). See Lipatov et al. (2008) or McElreath and Strimling
(2008) for examples of the continued use of the concepts.
9For example, Shiller (1997) shows that older Germans have stronger inﬂation aver-
sion than their oﬀspring, a cultural trait with an origin that can be traced back to the
hyperinﬂation episodes experienced in 1923 and 1948.8 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
erences with a ﬁxed (exogenous) probability τi,w i t h0 ≤ τi ≤ 1, i ∈ {a,b}.
With probability 1 − τi, the child is matched randomly with another indi-
vidual of the old generation and adopts her preference type.
Then, consider the transition probabilities at time t, P
ij
t , that a parent
of type i has a child adopting a preference of type j:
Paa
t = τa +( 1− τa)qa
t
Pab
t =( 1 − τa)(1− qa
t )
Pbb

























Given these transition probabilities, the fraction qa
t of adult individuals




























It is clear from the last line above that the fraction of type-a agents
in the old generation may stay constant across time only if the term in
square brackets is equal to 1. This would occur if either (i) qa
t =1or
(ii) τa = τb or (iii) both. However, case (i) — and, hence, case (iii) — is
excluded by assumption for the initial condition (0 <q a
t < 1), as otherwise
a stable structure of the mature population’s preferences emerges, in which
the initial type of preferences perpetuates forever. Therefore, only case
(ii) remains as a potentially relevant, symmetric option to consider; yet, it
deﬁnes a steady state for any initial condition, without any evolution of the
relative proportions of preferences in the society, and so is uninteresting for
our purposes.
In all other cases, diﬀerent from (i), (ii) and (iii), the intergenerational
dynamics of preferences depends on two parameters: ﬁrst, the proportion
of type-a agents inherited from past history, qa
t ,r e l a t i v e l yt ot h a to fqb
t;
second, the sign of the diﬀerence of the vertical transmission probabilities,
τa − τb, which determines the direction of preference convergence. Writing
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delivers a ﬁrst-order non-linear sequence, which does not admit any gen-
eral solution. However, given the assumptions on τa and τb, we know that
the stability points of this function are 0 and 1. The conditions for conver-
gence are the following:
• If τa < τb, then for any initial condition qa
0, qa
t→∞ → 0: social prefer-
ences will converge towards an economy with only type-b agents, i.e.,
a lower degree of central bank independence.
• If τa > τb, then for any initial condition qa
0, qa
t→∞ → 1: social prefer-
ences will converge towards an economy with only type-a agents. In
this case, given the direction of preference transmission convergence,
we can say that inﬂation aversion and, consequently, central bank in-
dependence are here to stay. Otherwise, the intergenerational stability
of monetary arrangements favoring central bank independence can not
necessarily be sustained.
Since by deﬁnition 0 <q a
0 < 1, no case can be ruled out, and everything
will depend on the relative size of τa and τb. To illustrate this result, we
present phase diagrams for the two opposite cases, namely where the diﬀer-
ence between the probabilities of transmitting a parent’s preference type to
her child is positive, τa−τb > 0, or negative, τa−τb < 0.A sc a nb es e e ni n
Figure 1, if the sign of the vertical-preference-transmission probability diﬀer-
ential between types a and b, τa −τb, is positive, then the intergenerational
dynamics of the fraction of preference type a converges to the steady state S
with coordinates (1,1) for any initial condition qa
0. The process is driven by
the concavity of the phase diagram curves (drawn for diﬀerent magnitudes
of the mentioned probability diﬀerential), no matter how large the positive
diﬀerential in question may be. This leads to an ultimate adoption of type
a agents’ preferences — which is the only preference type to survive, while
the other type is extinguished — implying perpetuation of the higher degree
of central bank independence in the deterministic model version with exoge-
nous vertical transmission we developed thus far. Conversely, Figure 2 shows
that if the probability diﬀerential τa − τb is negative, then the preferences
of society converge to type b at the steady state S0 with coordinates (0,0)
for any initial condition qa
0. The convexity of the phase diagram curves in
this case, no matter how large the negative vertical-preference-transmission
probability diﬀerential may be, directs convergence to an ultimate equilib-
rium where only type b survives, which results into perpetuation of the lower
degree of central bank independence.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Interestingly, the speed of the preference convergence process depends —
no matter its direction (to extinction of type b or a) — on (the absolute value10 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
of) the magnitude (or size) of the vertical-preference-transmission probabil-
ity diﬀerential, itself determining the curvature of the path of the fraction
of type-a preferences in our two phase diagrams. The larger (the modulus
of) this diﬀerential (e.g., compare the graphs for 0.9 versus 0.1 in Figure 1
and for −0.9 versus −0.1 in Figure 2), the more curved the path and the
quicker the convergence process.
Endogenous Vertical Preference Transmission Diﬀerently from
the situations depicted in ﬁgures 1 and 2, real-world cultural heterogeneity
does not seem to necessarily exhibit such convergence to an ultimate survival
of one of the types, with the others extinguished (as in evolutionary selection
mechanisms). Instead, an equilibrium where diﬀerent types of preferences
coexist would rather be sustained. Certain conditions on the transmission
mechanism that induce heterogeneity in the long-run stationary distribution
of preferences in the population have been examined by Bisin and Verdier
(2001). However, in their set-up this analysis comes at the cost of imposing
cultural substitution (as in Sáez-Martí and Sjögren (2008) too), which may
be quite restrictive. Cultural substitution means that the direct vertical
socialization of children (inside the family) and their oblique socialization
(outside the family) act as substitutes in the cultural transmission mecha-
nism. Then, there can exist a heterogeneous distribution of preferences in
the population which is globally stable. Intuitively, direct vertical trans-
mission acts as a cultural substitute for oblique transmission when parents
have less incentives to socialize their children once their values are widely
dominant in the population.
For illustrative purposes, we can assume cultural substitution in the
same way: the probability at time t of vertical socialization to the parent’s
trait i, τi
t, will be a negative function of the attained level of the fraction in
t h ep o p u l a t i o nw i t ht h a ts a m et r a i t ,qi































In this formulation, the eﬀort (or some other cost) of the parent to so-
cialize her child in her own trait decreases as the parent observes a large
fraction in the population that has already attained the trait, so that it be-
comes more likely for the child to be matched to the same trait even outside
the family. In our context, equation (4) will have the same consequences as
in the quoted papers, i.e., to drive the dynamics of the system to an ultimate
convergence to an interior equilibrium.
However, inﬂation aversion can, more realistically, be considered as a
gradual outcome of past experience and the lessons from it embodied in in-
stitutions. Recall that such a view is, in particular, consistent with Hayo’sIntergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 11
(1998) ‘inﬂation culture hypothesis’. This leads us to relax the cultural sub-
stitution assumption, and to address nondeterministic environments where
learning from inﬂation experiences feeds collective memory.
2.3 Stochastic Dynamics of Preference Transmission
Allowing for a richer dynamics requires to endogenize the vertical transmis-
sion of preferences in a stochastic extension of the set-up described thus
far. Combining features of the preceding subsections but keeping the model
as straightforward as possible given our objective, and in line with similar
mechanisms in the literatures on cultural transmission and social learning,
we now incorporate into it several new features.10
First, we now assume that the probability at time t of vertical social-
ization to the parent’s trait i, τi
t, is a positive function of the eﬀort the

















> 0. In other words, the more eﬀorts a parent puts, the more
eﬃcient her transmission to the next generation.
Second, we assume that the latter eﬀort, ei
t, in turn, is a positive function
of the severity of inﬂation (πt) a particular generation has witnessed (on
average, per annum, or as an annual maximum) in its adult life-span t
relative to the inﬂation observed by the preceding generation (πt−1), i.e.,
that of their parents. Thus, we write: ei
t (πt − πt−1,·), with the following
comparative statics property: ∂
∂(πt−πt−1)ei
t (πt − πt−1,·) > 0.T h e m e a n i n g
of this assumption is that, when a generation has suﬀered from high inﬂation,
it has taken steps to ensure that the future generations will not be driven to
the same fate. One can think of institutional modiﬁcations, here an increase
in the degree of central bank independence, as an eﬀective measure in that
sense. Hence, the eﬀo r tw i l ld e p e n do nt h e( m e m o r yo f )p a s th i s t o r yo f
inﬂation.
Third, and ﬁnal, to fully specify the model, one has to assume some dy-
namics for the forcing variable, πt. To keep the set-up as general as possible,
we assume that inﬂa t i o ni sd r i v e nb yas i m p l es t o c hastic low-frequency (since
our t covers a generation span) autoregressive process, e.g., πt = ρπt−1 + εt
with εt drawn from a normal distribution (allowing for diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of the mean and variance, as explained further down).
10Note that we consider immediately the endogenous case. A theoretical exploration of
the exogenous case under stochastic dynamics would imply to specify stochastic processes
for the probabilities of vertical transmission probabilities (τ
i
t). Assuming them random
variables, e.g., draws from uniform (0,1) independent distributions each period in the



















Our simulations of this equation with stochastic τ
i
t’s from diﬀrent q
a
0 generate ultimate
convergence to either of the types, as in the deterministic exogenous case, within 20 to 100




t.O t h e rs i m u l a t i o n
results, where the vertical transmission probabilities are stochastic but endogenous, are
reported in more detail further down.12 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)























t (πt − πt−1,·) >e b
t (πt − πt−1,·) whenever πt − πt−1 > 0,a n d
inversely in the opposite case.
The stochastic process driving inﬂation dynamics will ﬁr s ti m p a c tt h es o -
cialization eﬀort across types, then the preference transmission probabilities,
and ultimately the evolution of the proportions of types across generations.
This chain of eﬀects constitutes the mechanism generating irregular cycles
of temporary convergence towards one trait in the population or the other.
F o re x a m p l e ,i fi ne q u a t i o n( 5 )p a s t - p e r i o di n ﬂation has been relatively high,
socialization and voting will have taken place, potentially increasing the de-
gree of central bank independence. The present adult generation may thus
feel more insulated from misguidance (meaning, high inﬂation), and its ef-
fort to socialize children (to stronger inﬂation aversion) will be reduced. A
period of convergence away from the high inﬂation aversion the preceding
generation had built (and potentially transformed in inﬂation-proof institu-
tions) would then follow. Hence, preference shift cycles can arise and reverse
each other.
To explore further this mechanism, we simulated our model under al-
ternative parameters and shock processes. Our benchmark simulations con-
cerning inﬂation dynamics assumed, alternatively, 3 cases:12
1. π0 = με =0and σ2
ε =1 , i.e., a zero-inﬂation regime, or one consistent
with zero-inﬂation steady states in theoretical models;
2. π0 = με =2and σ2
ε =1 , i.e., a low-inﬂation regime, or one broadly
typical for advanced economies over the most recent generation span;
and
3. π0 = με =6and σ2
ε =3(all these 3 parameters 3 times higher than
in case 2), i.e., a high-inﬂation regime with higher volatility, or one
broadly typical for emerging markets over the most recent generation
span.
Moreover, all 3 benchmark cases were simulated for 3 alternative (con-
stant) values of the parameter measuring low-frequency inﬂation persis-
11The adopted formulation leaves for further research the inclusion of other potential
determinants of eﬀort (such as the cost of preference transmission), as well as of the prob-
ability that the child keeps the trait of his parent for a diﬀerent reason (such as inﬂuences
of peers or fashions), both captured by the (,·) notation in the respective functions.
12Our R programs and results are available upon request.Intergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 13








t (πt − πt−1,·),·
¤¯ ¯ = {0.5,0.2,0.1},
translating the reaction to observed inﬂation into corresponding eﬀort and,
ultimately, probability of passing over the parent’s trait to the child for the
two types14. In short, our simulations assumed that type-a agents increase
their socialization eﬀort and, hence, their vertical transmission probability
every time when current-period inﬂation is higher than previous-period in-
ﬂation; otherwise they decrease their eﬀort. Symmetrically, type-b agents in-
crease their socialization eﬀort and, hence, their vertical transmission proba-
b i l i t ye v e r yt i m ew h e nc u r r e n t - p e r i o di n ﬂation is lower than previous-period
inﬂation; otherwise they decrease their eﬀort. The magnitude of this in-
crease or decrease is discretized in the simulations into corresponding prob-
ability numbers whose diﬀerence yields 3 cases, namely: an absolute value
of 0.1 (obtained as in the footnote above) captures the case of a low en-
dogenous vertical probability diﬀerential, an absolute value of 0.2 (obtained
analogously from probabilities of 0.6 and 0.4) accounts for an intermediate
case, and an absolute value of 0.5 (obtained from probabilities of 0.75 and
0.25) features a high vertical probability diﬀerential. Figure 3 summarizes
our most interesting results, and the mentioned cases are depicted in each
of its three panels, respectively, for an underlying inﬂation process with
π0 = με =2and σ2
ε =1(i.e., a low-inﬂation regime) and qa
t =0 .5.
[Figure 3 about here]
Our model simulations pointed to the following conclusions. First, when-
ever the induced socialization eﬀort following experience with inﬂation and,








t (πt − πt−1,·),·
¤¯ ¯ of the order of
0.5 or more, convergence may take more than 75 or 100 generation spans
but it ultimately most likely occurs to one of the types. The conclusion is
kept when starting from an equal initial share in the population, qa
t =0 .5,
depending on the sequences of materialized inﬂation shocks. Under the par-
ticular sample for the inﬂation process drawn and illustrated in the bottom
panel Figure 3, the ultimate convergence is to qa
t → 1,w i t ht y p e - b extin-
guished. This pattern, as well as the inverse one of ultimate convergence
to qb
t → 1,w i t ht y p e - a extinguished, similarly occurred when simulating
13Note that in our model context persistence of the inﬂation process at generation spans
(t of the order of 25-30 years), i.e., at low frequency, may not necessarily correspond to
measured short-run (for annual or quarterly t)i n ﬂation persistence, i.e., at high frequency,
in the abundant literature.
14The simulations also assume a symmetric socialization eﬀort by the two types, in the
sense that, for example, when τ
a
t (·)=0 .55 and τ
b
t (·)=0 .45 after an observed increase
in inﬂation, then τ
b
t (·)=0 .55 and τ
a
t (·)=0 .45 a f t e ra no b s e r v e dd e c r e a s ei ni n ﬂation:












t (πt − πt−1,·),·
¤¯ ¯ =0 .1.14 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
the purely stochastic exogenous τi
t’s (as mentioned earlier in a footnote).
However, the convergence process is much slower in our endogenous case.
Second, the main insight from the simulations highlights the possibility
of irregular preference shift cycles manifested in a sequence of interior values
for the fraction of types which does not converge to any of the two corner
steady states, as illustrated in the top and middle panels of Figure 3. The
conditions which lead to such dynamics of the degree of inﬂation aversion
are the following two: (i) the endogenous vertical probability diﬀerential
should be relatively low (about or less than 0.1 or 0.2 in absolute value);
and (ii) the initial fraction should be close to the mid-point, qa
t ≈ qb
t.T h e
second condition is all the more of interest as it allows reversals at irregular
intervals in the voted degree of central bank independence too, and not only
preference cycles in the socialization eﬀort. For that particular reason we
present the simulation results starting exactly from qa
t =0 .5 in Figure 3).
Hence, as the simulations show, our stochastic endogenous preference
transmission set-up provides an alternative to the assumption of cultural
substitution, by explicitly modeling the response of parents in their social-
ization eﬀort — and, potentially, also voting outcome — to the change in
inﬂation they have observed. The extension of the framework along such
lines appears useful and realistic, as already argued in the present subsec-
tion.
To sum up, as our analysis and simulations suggest, endogenous prefer-
ence transmission in a stochastic economic environment can be understood
as a process of intergenerational social learning. In it, parent generations
experience inﬂation and transmit their preferences (i.e., their degree of in-
ﬂation aversion) and institutions (i.e., the corresponding degree of central
bank independence they voted for) to children generations. Both these chan-
nels of transmission of a generation’s preferences are, in essence, forms of
collective memory: formal, through voting (on the degree of central bank
independence, modiﬁed whenever majority switches), and informal, through
socialization eﬀorts (to inﬂuence inﬂation aversion preferences of their oﬀ-
spring, possible even when the type in question is in minority).
3 Empirical Evidence
The model developed in the theoretical section of the paper highlights a
key determinant of the long-run evolution of inﬂation aversion, namely, the
proportion of the type-a agents in the population (qa
t ), itself driven by so-
cialization eﬀort (ei
t) which is a function of inﬂation dynamics (πt − πt−1).
In this section, we provide empirical evidence that supports the model’s as-
sumptions and implications. We ﬁr s tp r e s e n tt h en o v e lm e a s u r eo fi n ﬂation
aversion we had to construct out of survey responses for our purposes, and
describe how it diﬀers from the few existing ones in the literature. We thenIntergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 15
turn to the discussion of our approach in implementing a relevant test for
the proposed theory and of our econometric results.
3.1 Measuring Inﬂation Aversion
The focus of our model and, by way of consequence, the dependent variable
in our regressions is the degree of inﬂation aversion. Its intergenerational
transmission being of central interest here, the OLG framework we applied
and extended was designed for the analysis of long-run dynamics. However,
there does not exist, to our knowledge, inﬂation aversion measures spanning
generation-long periods. We thus have to resort to cross-section estimations
in assessing the impact of the determinants of inﬂation aversion highlighted
by our theory.15
Our measure of inﬂation aversion is based on the International Social
Survey Program (ISSP) conducted by the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research, which collects nationally representative data
in a way that is comparable across countries. We employ the 2006 survey,
providing us with data from 33 countries on answers from individuals to
questionnaires concerning the role of government in society (Role of Gov-
ernment, wave IV, hereafter abbreviated as RoG IV). To measure inﬂation
aversion, we aggregate some of the answers to the following question (7b):
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the gov-
ernment’s responsibility to keep prices under control?
The potential answers proposed to the respondents are: ‘deﬁnitely should
be’, ‘probably should be’, ‘probably should not be’, ‘deﬁnitely should not
be’, ‘can’t choose’ and, ﬁnally, ‘no answer’. Hereafter, we use the sum of the
percentage shares of the answers having chosen the ﬁrst two possibilities as
measuring a country’s degree of inﬂation aversion. We, in eﬀect, construct a
survey-based measure of absolute inﬂation aversion, which is diﬀerent from
the few other measures one can ﬁnd in the literature.16 More precisely,
Scheve (2004) and Jayadev (2006) have also analyzed data from the ISSP,
but from the preceding wave (ISSP RoG III, run in 1996), and have made
u s eo fam e a s u r eo fr e l a t i v ei n ﬂation aversion, employing a diﬀerent question,
where respondents are asked if the government’s priority should be to ﬁght
unemployment or inﬂation. Such a measure is directly related to a business
cycle framework (and to a kind of Phillips curve mechanism), and could
thus not be used in our context, hence our choice of an absolute measure of
15Our dataset and EViews programs are available upon request.
16It has to be added that no confusion could exist in respondents’ minds, as another
question in the survey directly bears on the ﬁxing of prices by law. The question we use
is therefore clearly the one relevant to the (absolute) inﬂation preferences of people.16 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
inﬂation aversion.17
Still another measure of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r ei st h ei n d e x
constructed by Krause and Méndez (2005) and employed in Krause and
Méndez (2008) for 34 countries over a period of 24 years. This index is also
deﬁned as a relative degree of inﬂation aversion, and it aims at revealing
policymakers’ preferences. This measure is the weight a policymaker puts
on inﬂation stabilization in an objective function optimized under short-term
(meaning, business-cycle like) constraints. Hence, not only their measure is
relative and centered on policymakers, but — like the other relative measure —
it would be more useful for short-term analysis of perceived policy trade-oﬀs
rather than for studying the long-run trends our model focuses on.
Some descriptive statistics concerning our measure of absolute inﬂation
aversion are exposed in Table 1. A striking ﬁnding is that, on average, all
the countries in the sample are relatively inﬂation averse, as 86.4 percent
of the respondents reply that governments should deﬁnitely, or probably,
control inﬂation. Only one country, the Czech Republic, has a much lower
degree of inﬂation aversion (67.4%). However, the remaining 32 countries
a r ea l m o s te q u a l l yd i s t r i b u t e di nt h et hree other quartiles, and the stan-
dard deviation for the whole sample is 8.3,o r10 percent of the average,
which is a signiﬁcant degree of variation. We will comment further down on
country characteristics, when interpreting our empirical ﬁndings. But this
brief overview of our sample shows that inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o nl e v e l sd i ﬀer quite
strongly among countries and regions and that such variations deserve to be
explained.
[Table 1 about here]
3.2 Explaining Inﬂation Aversion
As Shiller (1997) notes, even more important than the international diﬀer-
ences in inﬂation aversion are the intergenerational ones. Since the 1960s,
demographic changes have been tremendous, as a large generation of baby-
boomers is now entering into its retirement period. This generation has
accumulated some savings in addition to their pensions, and this sheer fact
would have contributed to make it much more conservative than it was in
the 1960s. This would have remained unnoticeable except for the size of
this generation, which has enabled baby-boomers to translate their evolving
preferences into policies (see, e.g., Farvaque et al., forthcoming, for evidence
on the role of this generation in the reduction in inﬂation). Thus, an obvious
candidate to proxy the type-a agents is the share of retirees in the mature
population, as retirees can be considered as being more inﬂation averse than
17Though there have been four waves of the ISSP survey on the Role of Government
(1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006), only four countries participated in all four of them, thus
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working age people. To verify this feature (or, rather, hypothesis) in the
data, implying a particular testable implication of our theory, we examine
how retirees responded to the ISSP 2006 RoG IV question on inﬂation (ques-
tion 7b, see above). Comparing the responses of retirees to the ones of the
working age population shows that retirees are, in general, more inﬂation
averse than people of working age. More precisely, the sum of the shares of
the people responding that governments should, deﬁnitely or probably, keep
prices under control is, on average for our total sample, larger for retirees
than for the working age population.
Therefore, a ﬁrst long-run determinant of the degree of inﬂation aversion
in our empirical test is the proportion of retirees in the population. We
employ both the share of the retirees and the ratio of the share of retirees
to the share of working age population. These two variables summarize
the preference structure of the theoretical economy described above, the
proportion of retirees being the more inﬂation averse part of the mature
population (which votes), i.e., they are our type-a agents, while the working
age population in line with the above reasoning are our type-b agents.18
In the model as in the real life, evolving inﬂation aversion perceptions can
be translated into the degree of central bank independence. During the last
two decades at least, granting more independence to the monetary authority
from the government has been thought of as a quick ﬁx against inﬂation.
It has also been econometrically shown that central bank independence can
bear strongly on inﬂation (see, among others, Brumm, 2002, and the meta-
regression analysis by de Haan and Klomp, 2008). Hence, the empirical
veriﬁcation of our model includes an index of central bank independence to
a c c o u n tf o rt h ei n ﬂation aversion a society has embedded in its monetary
institutions, as per our theory. Since our data on inﬂation aversion is from
2006, we make use of the central bank independence index computed by
Arnone et al. (2009) for 2003. Yet, our sample of countries also includes
emerging markets. In these countries, studies on central bank independence
have consistently shown that indexes based on legal aspects are not always
signiﬁcant. To deal with this issue, the literature generally relies on the
turnover of central bankers (see, for example, Dreher et al., 2008). Using
such a measure in our framework, however, would be orthogonal, as turnover
ratios are by deﬁnition related to short-term issues. Hence, to account for
the fact that the rule of law is as important as the legal independence of
the central bank, we include a measure of the protection of property rights,
developed by the Heritage Foundation and now regularly considered as a
reliable way to capture the respect for the law (see, for example, La Porta
et al., 2004).
Finally, to proxy the channel in our model which highlights the impact of
past experiences of high inﬂation transmitted through collective memory —
18A detailed description of our dataset and sources is to be found in the Appendix.18 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
or, in other words, learning from history (πt−πt−1), we add to the regressors
a dummy, equal to 1 when episodes of hyper- or high inﬂation have been
known in the 20th century, using the classiﬁcation in Fischer et al. (2002).
The cross-section equation intended to broadly test the key implications
of our model is, thus, of the following general form:
InﬂAverst = α + βRetireest + γHighInﬂDumt + δCBI t + ηPropRst + ²t,
where InﬂAvers is our measure of absolute inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o na n dRetirees is
the share of retirees in the population or (depending on the regression, to be
clariﬁed further down) the ratio of the share of the retirees to the share of the
working age population. Then, HighInﬂDum is the dummy representing past
(high) inﬂation experiences, CBI is the central bank independence index,
PropRs stands for the property rights index and ² is the error term. The
equation is estimated by weighted least squares (WLS). WLS is a natural
choice, insofar as our ISSP 2006 RoG IV sample includes countries as small
as Ireland or Slovenia and as big as the US, Japan and Russia, in terms
of both population and real GDP (which we choose as our two alternative
weighting vectors). In the regressions weighted by the population, we also
controlled for the eﬀect of the country being richer or poorer, by employing
the real GDP per capita for 2004 (from the World Penn Tables 6.2, see
Heston et al., 2006).
The benchmark results from our estimation are presented in Table 2.
The weighting vector consists of the respective population by country, data
for 2004 (from the World Penn Tables 6.2, see Heston et al., 2006).
[Table 2 about here]
To capture the model’s degrees of inﬂation aversion (type-a relative to
type-b), regression 1 uses the ratio of the share of retirees to the share
of workers as the key regressor of interest, plus real GDP per capita, the
high inﬂation dummy, the CBI index and the property rights index, and an
intercept. All the variables are statistically signiﬁcant: the property rights
index and real GDP per capita at the 10% level, and all other four at the 1%
level, and all have signs in conformity with theoretical expectations. The
explanatory power of the regression is very high. It thus appears that the
higher the share of retirees with respect to the working age population, the
higher is a country’s inﬂation aversion. As was predicted by our model,
it turns out that the historical experience countries have known negatively
impacts inﬂation aversion. This conﬁrms that high inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep a s tl e a d s
the contemporaneous generation to take steps to avoid returning to such a
damaging path. Consequently, the current generation (their children) feels
therefore more protected from inﬂation, and inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni sr e d u c e d .
This is conﬁrmed by the negative sign on the CBI index coeﬃcient, showingIntergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 19
that central bank independence reduces a country’s inﬂation aversion, which
we again interpret as agents feeling less threatened by inﬂation, and thus
being less wary about it.
To test the joint importance of our collective memory proxy and the
institutional arrangement resulting from the voting in our model, regres-
sion 2 adds to regression 1 an interaction term combining the high inﬂation
dummy with the CBI index. The latter interaction term comes out as statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 10% level and has the right negative sign. However,
it invalidates the statistical signiﬁcance of the high inﬂation dummy taken
separately (as it is now accounted for in the interaction term) as well as that
of the property rights index. It also increases the statistical signiﬁcance of
the main regressor of interest and its marginal impact on the degree of in-
ﬂation aversion.
One minor inconvenience of this speciﬁcation is that we cannot have a
more precise quantitative interpretation concerning the marginal eﬀect of
the regressor of key interest on the degree of inﬂation aversion. To be able
to judge about that, as well as to check robustness, we proceed to regression
3 by considering separately the shares of both retirees and the working age
population, and not their ratio. This speciﬁcation highlights two insightful
results. First, the share of retirees remains statistically signiﬁcant in deter-
mining inﬂation aversion, but not the share of the working age population.
The type-a agents thus determine the degree of inﬂation aversion, which
could be expected given the demographic evolutions the world has known
in the last decades. Second, we can now see that an increase of one per-
centage point in the share of retirees leads to an increase of almost half a
percentage point in the degree of inﬂation aversion, ceteris paribus.T h i si s
a very strong marginal impact, stronger than the comparable (being share
variables) marginal impacts — all in the opposite, negative direction — of the
CBI index (of about 13 basis points), the property rights index (of about 16
basis points, and only slightly insigniﬁcant at the 10% level), the high inﬂa-
tion dummy (8 basis points) and real GDP per capita (practically, of zero
impact). Regression 4 ﬁnally adds the same interaction term (as in regres-
sion 2), which however now is not signiﬁcant, making insigniﬁcant (again)
both the high inﬂation dummy and the property rights index.
The real-world view — and our model’s driving hypothesis — that a gen-
eration builds up inﬂation-ﬁghting institutions when it suﬀers from high
inﬂation is thus empirically corroborated by the WLS regression results we
summarized. To further check robustness, we altered the weighting vector,
now using real GDP instead of population. In this second weighting scheme
we also had to omit one of the regressors in the ﬁrst weighting scheme,
namely, real GDP per capita, to avoid potential inference problems with
the used weights. Insofar this variable showed up as signiﬁcant, but with
very low coeﬃcients in the preceding set of results, such an omission now
does not weaken the estimation. Table 3 shows the results from the WLS20 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
speciﬁcation with real GDP weighting.
[Table 3 about here]
As can be seen from the table, the change in the weighting vector does
not aﬀect in any important way our ﬁndings, neither qualitatively nor quan-
titatively. In particular, most of the regressors are still statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level and have the theoretically implied signs. Moreover, the
coeﬃcients have similar magnitudes to the analogous regression with pop-
ulation weights. Now, however, the inﬂation dummy becomes marginally
insigniﬁcant, but the property rights index gains more signiﬁcance in both
statistical and magnitude sense. The overall ﬁt of the regression is very
high again. Adding the interaction term for the combined eﬀect of the high
inﬂation dummy and the CBI index slightly strengthens the regression, as
the latter term is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level and has the right
negative sign. The other variables remain statistically signiﬁcant as before
(and the dummy is not signiﬁcant as before), the overall ﬁt staying prac-
tically the same. As was seen earlier in Table 2, this second speciﬁcation
slightly increases the statistical signiﬁcance of the main regressor of interest
(the share of retirees) and its marginal impact on the degree of inﬂation
aversion.
Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 in Table 3 conﬁrm the two important ﬁndings of
the analogous regressions in Table 2: the share of retirees remains statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in determining inﬂation aversion, but not the share of the
working age population; and, we can see that an increase of one percentage
point in the share of retirees leads to an increase of almost two-thirds of a
percentage point in the degree of inﬂation aversion, ceteris paribus.T h u s ,
the marginal impact of the share of retirees on the degree of a society’s
inﬂation aversion is even stronger when using real GDP weights instead of
population weights. Moreover, the marginal impact of the share of retirees
also remains higher (in absolute value) than the comparable eﬀect of the
CBI index (of about −11 basis points).
Putting the empirical results in a regional perspective is another worth-
while way to look at their relevance. Table 4 gives another view of our
survey-based measure of absolute inﬂation aversion, organizing the coun-
tries by region.
[Table 4 about here]
First, it appears that countries belonging to the European Monetary
Union (EMU) share a higher degree of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o nt h a nt h er e s to ft h e
sample and, interestingly, that this degree is higher than for countries that
belong to the European Union (EU), but are not members of the EMU. This
tends to show that the adoption of a high degree of independence for theIntergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 21
European Central Bank probably has not yet infused the whole population.
That institutions do not have immediate impacts, but may need time to
establish their credentials, is again in agreement with our model. This latter
claim is also conﬁrmed by comparing the inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o nl e v e l si nG e r m a n y
and in Russia. Though both countries have suﬀered from hyperinﬂation,
Germany has since had time to build inﬂation averse institutions (notably
the Bundesbank, before joining the EMU), while Russia’s central bank has
still not received full independence from the government.
Second, and even more interesting is the high degree of inﬂation aversion
in emerging market economies, and particularly among the non-European
ones (94.3%), especially once one remarks that the regions where inﬂation
aversion is the highest are also the ones with the lowest standard deviation.
The high level of inﬂation aversion among emerging market economies can
be related to their inﬂationary experience.
Third, as stated above, the Czech Republic has the lowest level of inﬂa-
tion aversion in our sample. This can notably be explained by the strong
degree of central bank independence of its central bank (0.88, superior to the
sample average of 0.72), even reinforced over the last decade by the adoption
of an inﬂation targeting regime. Moreover, most of the countries that have
in the last decades implemented such an inﬂation targeting regime show in-
ferior levels of inﬂation aversion (in addition to the Czech Republic, that is
the case for Canada, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom). This
tends to show that inﬂation targeting can back the more institutionalized
degree of central bank independence.19
To sum up, in our view, the results are largely supportive of the model
predictions. First, they show that the underlying evolution of a society’s
preferences is fundamental to observed macroeconomic trends such as, in
our case, inﬂation. Second, they suggest that individuals may vary their
socialization eﬀorts to transmit their preferences, depending on the context
and the relative incentives they have to face.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have developed a basic dynamic-stochastic framework ap-
propriate to study the endogenous transmission of inﬂation aversion pref-
erences across generations. We have shown that the stability of a society’s
degree of inﬂation aversion depends on the direction and speed of changes in
the structure of the population, themselves a function of parent socialization
eﬀorts in response to observed inﬂation.
19The exceptions (i.e., inﬂation targeters that show slightly higher degrees of inﬂa-
tion aversion) are Australia and Hungary. Both countries have, however, recently known
episodes of strong growth, for the former, and of political instability, for the latter, which
may have re-ignited inﬂation scares among the population.22 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
We have then proposed an empirical test of our theory, making use of
an own, novel measure of inﬂation aversion constructed out of survey data.
We have provided robust cross-section evidence that a nation’s demographic
structure, in particular the variation in the share of retirees or of their ra-
tio to the share of workers (as proxies for the degree of inﬂation aversion),
is a key driver of social preferences with regard to inﬂation. The results
also highlight several other major long-run determinants of inﬂation aver-
sion consistent with our model, namely, experience with past inﬂation and
the collective memory embodied in institutions such as central bank inde-
pendence or transmitted through the process of socialization. Our ﬁndings,
thus, support the suggested theory, notably stressing how fundamental it
is to understand the underlying trends in individuals’ preferences and the
mechanisms behind their intergenerational transmission.
The model we analyzed could be extended in several directions. On the
theoretical side, allowing for population growth and/or higher heterogene-
ity of traits could provide valuable insights, as well as the examination of
diﬀerent processes guiding low-frequency inﬂation dynamics. On the empir-
ical side, another implementation compatible with the theory we presented
would be to consider how the evolution of the proportions of net savers
and spenders in an economy can inﬂuence its degree of inﬂation aversion,
provided data become available on a comparable cross-country basis.Intergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 23
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AD a t a D e ﬁnitions and Sources
• Degree of Inﬂation Aversion
— Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on the role of
government in society (Role of Government, wave IV) conducted
by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Re-
search in 2006 for 33 participating countries.
— Deﬁnition: authors’ computations, summing up the percentage
shares of responses falling in the ﬁrst two categories of answers
(highlighted in Italics among the enumerated below) to the fol-
lowing question (7b):
∗ ‘On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the
government’s responsibility to keep prices under control?’
∗ the potential answers proposed to the respondents are:
· ‘deﬁnitely should be’;
· ‘probably should be’;
· ‘probably should not be’;




— Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (annual se-
ries by country: April 2008 and June 2009 issues, accessed via
ESDS), for the year 2006; except for Taiwan (see below); World
Bank staﬀ estimates from various sources including census re-
ports, the United Nations Population Division’s World Popula-
tion Prospects, national statistical oﬃces, household surveys con-
ducted by national agencies, and Macro International.
— Deﬁnitions:
∗ population, total (SP.POP.TOTL);
∗ share of retirees: Population ages 65 or older (% of older,
SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS);
∗ share of working age population: Population ages 15-64
(% of total, SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS).
— Source for Taiwan: authors’ computations of the above shares
in the total population based on disaggregated data for the year
2000 by age groups from the National Statistics Republic of China
(Taiwan); www.eng.stat.gov.tw.28 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
• Institutions
— Sources:
∗ central bank independence index: from Arnone et al.
(2009), for the year 2003; except for Taiwan: from Cukierman
(1992), for the year 1989;
∗ property rights index: from The Heritage Foundation, for
the year 2009; www.heritage.org;
∗ high inﬂation dummy: authors’ coding in conformity with
Fischer et al. (2002).
• Macroeconomic Data
— Source: Penn World Table Version 6.2 — see Heston et al. (2006);
for the year 2004.
∗ population;
∗ real GDP per capita, in PPP-USD;
∗ real GDP, in PPP-USD: authors’ computations multiplying
the above two numbers.Intergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 29
inﬂation aversion mean median max min quant. s. d. skew. kurt. obs.
[60, 70) 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.674 — — — 1
[70, 80) 0.770 0.773 0.796 0.702 0.773 0.027 -1.96 5.83 9
[80, 90) 0.860 0.865 0.897 0.825 0.865 0.025 0.01 1.90 10
[90, 100) 0.946 0.937 0.980 0.910 0.937 0.023 0.07 1.54 13
all 0.864 0.870 0.980 0.674 0.870 0.083 -0.41 2.23 33
Table 1: Inﬂation Aversion: Descriptive Statistics by Quantile
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 2006 RoG IV.30 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
Regression 1 2 3 4
intercept 1.1030*** 1.0418*** 0.9104*** 1.0159***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0042) (0.0072)
retirees/workers 0.3154*** 0.3376*** — —
(0.0022) (0.0001) — —
retirees share — — 0.4849*** 0.5114***
— — (0.0002) (0.0002)
workers share — — 0.2847 0.0466
— — (0.5201) (0.9355)
real GDP pc -2.98·10−6* -5.35·10−6** -3.78·10−6* -5.31·10−6**
(0.0565) (0.0162) (0.0962) (0.0141)
high inﬂation dummy -0.0338*** 0.0794 -0.0522** 0.0591
(0.0010) (0.1670) (0.0247) (0.5641)
CBI index -0.1474*** -0.1105*** -0.1294** -0.1099***
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0135) (0.0047)
property rights index -0.1801* -0.0437 -0.1602 -0.0528
(0.0581) (0.7372) (0.1019) (0.6412)
CBI × high inﬂation — -0.1775* — -0.1554
— (0.0614) — (0.2381)
adjusted R2 0.9364 0.9443 0.9384 0.9420
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2: Determinants of Inﬂation Aversion: Population-WLS Estimates
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 population weights from Hes-
ton et al. (2006) for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+γHighInflDumt+δCBIt+ηPropRst+²t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.Intergenerational Transmission of Inﬂation Aversion 31
Regression 1 2 3 4
intercept 1.1332*** 1.1272*** 0.7873** 0.8015**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0353) (0.1891)
retirees/workers 0.3564*** 0.3650* — —
(0.0080) (0.0738) — —
retirees share — — 0.6462*** 0.6522***
— — (0.0048) (0.0043)
workers share — — 0.4876 0.4603
— — (0.3387) (0.6345)
high inﬂation dummy -0.0581 0.0054 -0.0830* -0.0287
(0.1498) (0.9384) (0.0708) (0.7999)
CBI index -0.1237*** -0.1185** -0.1125** -0.1087**
(0.0100) (0.0380) (0.0203) (0.0146)
property rights index -0.3720*** -0.3713*** -0.3761*** -0.3755***
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0002)
CBI × high inﬂation — -0.1317** — -0.1105
— (0.0473) — (0.2622)
adjusted R2 0.9048 0.9028 0.9057 0.9032
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3: Determinants of Inﬂation Aversion: Real GDP-WLS Estimates
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 real GDP weights from Heston
et al. (2006) for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+γHighInflDumt+δCBIt+ηPropRst+²t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.32 Farvaque and Mihailov (revised version: August 2009)
inﬂation aversion
Advanced economies (17 countries)
European EMU (7) FI FR DE IE NL PT ES
mean: 0.857 (s.d.: 0.076) 0.786 0.828 0.783 0.930 0.796 0.963 0.910
European non-EMU (5) DK NO SE CH GB
mean: 0.823 (s.d.: 0.053) 0.773 0.895 0.825 0.772 0.852
non-European (5) AU CA JP NZ US
mean: 0.806 (s.d.: 0.088) 0.868 0.702 0.923 0.769 0.770
Emerging markets (16 countries)
European (7) HR CZ HU LV PO RU SI
mean: 0.839 (s.d.: 0.094) 0.870 0.674 0.870 0.836 0.780 0.980 0.861
non-European (9) CL DO IL KR PH ZA TW UY VE
mean: 0.943 (s.d.: 0.026) 0.930 0.967 0.897 0.967 0.958 0.931 0.974 0.923 0.937
Table 4: Inﬂation Aversion: Descriptive Statistics by Country Groups
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 2006 RoG IV. Country codes as in
ISSP, namely: AU: Australia, CA: Canada, CH: Switzerland, CL: Chile, CZ: Czech
Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, DO: Dominican Republic, ES: Spain, FI:
Finland, FR: France, GB: Great Britain, HR: Croatia, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland,
IL: Israel, JP: Japan, KR: Korea, LV: Latvia, NL: Netherlands, NO: Norway, NZ:
New Zealand, PH: Philippines, PO: Poland, PT: Portugal, RU: Russia, SE: Sweden,
SI: Slovenia, TW: Taiwan, US: United States, UY: Uruguay, VE: Venezuela, ZA:
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Figure 3: Stochastic Endogenous Dynamics of Type-a Preferences with Sym-
metric Socialization Eﬀort Responding to Observed Inﬂation: Simulation
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